Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

722 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Barkley: If that is true, why did you rely for the action you took
upon some defi nite instruction from Washington instead of
exercising greater judgment and discretion in doing what you
could do with what you had?
Short: Because they were my only sources of information. I
had no source of information outside Hawaii, except the War
Department. . . . [T]he War Department had many sources of
information. Th ey had military attaches. Th ey got reports from
the State Department and the Commerce Department. Th ey
had a certain number of agents scattered around in the Far
East. If they were in a position to get information that I had no
access to at all, I had every reason to believe that their judgment
would be better than my just . . . reading the newspapers. 149
Short Defends Army’s Efforts During Attack
Immediately after the attack, Short said he made several reports
by telephone to Washington. Th en he sent a radiogram giving a
succinct account of the event from the Army’s viewpoint:
Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked
Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop
Extensive damage to at least three hangars Wheeler Field three
hangars Hickam Field and to planes caught on the ground
Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over one hour
Stop Unconfi rmed report that the ships in Pearl Harbor badly
damaged Stop Marine air fi eld EWA also badly damaged Stop
Details later. 150
Before the last raid was completed, Short said, a total of 14
U.S. planes got in the air. “Th ey shot down 10 enemy planes.”
Senator Lucas was impressed: “So it is a pretty safe assumption
149 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 7, pp. 3012–13.
150 Ibid., p. 3096.