Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

720 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
and the attack, he could only assume that his action had been
appropriate.
Short mentioned two messages in particular that had been
available in Washington and that would have been “more important
than those that were sent” to Pearl Harbor—the ships-inharbor
bombing-plan intercepts and the December 7 “One p.m.
Message.” 143 He said that had that message been relayed immediately
by scrambler phone—both he and Marshall had such
phones and it took only about ten or 15 minutes to get a message
through—it would have reached him four hours before, instead
of seven hours after, the attack. 144
Short said Marshall’s last-minute message, concerning the
“One p.m. Message,” was marked:
Delay in deciphering due to not being marked “Priority” in
Washington. . . . If this message had been sent by scrambler
telephone there would have been time to warm up the planes
and put them in the air. . . . Th e fact that the War Department
sent this message by radio in code instead of telephoning it in
the clear . . . indicates that the War Department, even as late as
6:48 a.m., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an
attack on Honolulu as likely enough to warrant drastic action
to prepare the islands for the sneak attack. 145
Short quoted the War Department’s Field Service Manual on
the importance of “adequate and timely military intelligence” to
enable the commander “to draw logical conclusions concerning
enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is thus an essential
factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of subsequent
operations.” 146 Asked if he was complaining because he
143Ibid., part 12, pp. 261–63, 248.
144Ibid., part 7, pp. 3220, 3041.
145Ibid., pp. 2940, 3220–322.
146Ibid., p. 2961. See War Department, FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations:
Operations, May 22, 1941, p. 40, paragraph 194.