Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 719
ciphers, and secret documents. 139 Th e other reported that Tokyo
had ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila each
to destroy its “Purple” machine; the Batavia machine, it said, had
already been returned to Tokyo. 140 Short denied having known
about either message. 141
Like Kimmel, Short did not expect a break in U.S.-Japanese
relations as long as the representatives of the two nations were
still talking in Washington. Neither man knew, as Washington
offi cials had learned from the intercepts, that the Japanese considered
the negotiations “de facto ruptured” and that the Japanese
ambassadors were only keeping up the pretense of negotiating.
From what Kimmel and Short could glean from newspaper
accounts, the negotiations were continuing, supposedly in good
faith.
Short, again like Kimmel, had been led to believe that an
attack on Pearl Harbor, although possible, was not probable. In
view of Hawaii’s large population of Japanese aliens, sabotage and
subversion seemed much more likely than an attack from outside.
He reiterated that messages from the War Department (see
above) had led him to the view that the “prime desire” of the U.S.
government was “to avoid war and to not let any international
incident happen in Hawaii that might bring on war.” 142
Short’s task, as he interpreted No. 472, was to guard against
“hostile action” in the form of sabotage and subversion. Th us
Short had responded by reporting that he had alerted for sabotage.
Several other messages from Washington at about the same
time also advised him to guard against sabotage, reassuring him
in his decision. Hearing nothing further from Washington during
the nine days between his November 27 sabotage alert report
139Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, OPNAV #031850.
140Ibid., p. 1408, OPNAV #031855.
141Ibid., part 7, p. 3105.
142Ibid., pp. 2978–79.