Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

718 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
number of persons; no distribution should be made outside of
Washington. 136
Not only was Short denied the intelligence derived from
MAGIC, but the information he did receive was confusing.
“Navy messages were habitually rather more aggressive than the
Army,” Short said.
On October 16 [Kimmel] had a [Navy Department] message
in which they said Japan would attack. On October 20 I had
one from the War Department saying they didn’t expect any
[attack]. My message said nothing about a war warning and
[Kimmel’s] did.
Short thought “the Navy messages were inclined to be more
positive, possibly . . . more alarming, in the context” than the
Army’s. 137
Th e War Department had sent Short no information concerning
any U.S. military commitments arising out of the United
States-British Staff Conversations and the Joint Canada-United
States Defense Plan, which might have led him to expect U.S.
involvement in the Far East. If he had known that Singapore
had been alerted and that the Governor of the Netherlands East
Indies had ordered “comprehensive mobilization of his armed
forces,” Short testifi ed, he would have realized that “they considered
war very imminent out there. . . . It would have meant possible
hostilities on Hawaii, but not necessarily an attack.” 138
He was asked about two December 3 Navy messages sent
to Kimmel. One had announced that Japanese diplomatic and
consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila,
Washington, and London had been instructed to destroy codes,
136 Ibid., part 7, p. 2954. See also part 2, p. 791, Miles testimony.
137 Ibid., part 7, p. 2983. See part 14, p. 1327, Navy October 16, 1941, Message
162203, and War Department October 20, 1941, Message 1234P.
138 Ibid., part 7, p. 3176.