Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 717
Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. . . .
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible
at any moment.” Short was told that “If hostilities cannot comma
repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that
Japan commit the fi rst overt act.” Short was “to undertake such
reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary . . . so
as not comma repeat not comma to alarm the civil population
or disclose intent.” 134 In response, he alerted for sabotage and so
notifi ed Washington. Otherwise he received no Army warning
of likely Japanese action or message giving diplomatic or military
background that would have enabled him to judge the situation
in the Pacifi c for himself.
Short Not Advised of
Available Evidence of Imminent Crisis
Short said he was convinced that the
War Department was aware of the fact that I did not have this
information [regarding the mounting U.S.-Japanese crisis] and
had already decided that I should not get this information. . . .
A defi nite decision had been made by the War Department
that neither the Japanese intercepts nor the substance of them
should be given to the commanding general in Hawaii. 135
He quoted Miles’s testimony before the committee: “Th ere were
no steps taken to distribute these messages to that General
[Short].” Th is decision was in line with
the general policy laid down by the Chief of Staff that these
messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our
ability to decode them should be confi ned to the least possible
134Ibid., part 7, p. 2935; part 14, p. 1328, November 27, 1941, Army Message
472.
135Ibid., part 7 pp. 2953–54. See also part 29, p. 2403.