Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

716 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support
such action. However,
Bicknell continued, “it must be evident to the Japanese that in
case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly
have to fi ght the United States within a relatively short time.” 128
“What do you understand by ‘binding agreement?’” Ferguson
asked. “To be binding,” Short said, “it should be approved by the
Congress.” He thought Bicknell “might have meant simply any
agreement that had been made and approved by the president,
and not made public, something that the president expected to
set forth in the Senate.” 129
Ferguson recalled that “we weren’t consulted on the question
of the shooting orders in the Atlantic. . . . Congress didn’t say
anything about that.” 130 Short said he knew that the Navy Basic
War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, had been “drawn up with the idea
apparently that when it went into eff ect we would be allied with
Britain and the Dutch.” 131 However, Short said he “felt at that
time that the American public would not have been willing to
have an agreement ratifi ed that we would go to war to defend the
Netherlands East Indies or Singapore.” 132
On November 24 he said he received, through Kimmel, a
Navy Department message stating that “a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or
Guam is a possibility.” 133
Th en on November 27 Short said he received War Department
radiogram No. 472 notifying him that “Negotiations with the
128Ibid., part 7, p. 3173.
129Ibid., p. 3174.
130Ibid., p. 3180.
131Ibid., p. 3175.
132Ibid., p. 3174.
133Ibid., part 7, p. 2934; part 14, p. 1328, November 24, 1941, Navy Message
242005.