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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 2 715<br />

Short thought that July 8 message, “when they were pointing out<br />

action <strong>of</strong> the Japanese against Russia, was a rather defi nite prediction,<br />

<strong>and</strong> was the only prediction that the War Department<br />

ever made direct to me.” 124 Short said that “at no time after July 8<br />

did I ever have an Army message that indicated any probable line<br />

<strong>of</strong> action by the Japanese.” 125<br />

He said he was advised on October 16, through a Navy message<br />

to Kimmel, that “hostilities between Japan <strong>and</strong> Russia are a<br />

strong possibility. Since the U.S. <strong>and</strong> Britain are held responsible<br />

by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility<br />

that Japan may attack these two powers.” 126 On October<br />

20 Short had a message from the War Department that appeared<br />

to confl ict. “Tension between United States <strong>and</strong> Japan remains<br />

strained,” it said, but according to the War Department’s estimate<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Japanese situation, “no repeat no abrupt change in Japanese<br />

foreign policy appears imminent.” 127<br />

Short also testifi ed that on October 17 one <strong>of</strong> Short’s intelligence<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi cers, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, had<br />

prepared a report on the situation. “Following the principles <strong>of</strong><br />

defeating one opponent at a time,” he had written,<br />

it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military<br />

resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British;<br />

<strong>and</strong> do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions,<br />

because <strong>of</strong> no known binding agreement between the<br />

British <strong>and</strong> Americans for joint military action against Japan,<br />

36), varies slightly in punctuation, etc., <strong>and</strong> is dated July 7 (not July 8), 1941.<br />

124Ibid., part 7, p. 3180.<br />

125Ibid., p. 3072.<br />

126Ibid., p. 2933. See part 14, p. 1327, October 16, 1941, Navy Message<br />

162203.<br />

127Ibid., part 7, p. 2933. See part 14, p. 1327, War Department October 20,<br />

1941, message. Th is telegram as transcribed in Roberts Commission Report<br />

(part 24, p. 2164, Exhibit 36) is dated October 18 (not 20), 1941.

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