Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

714 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
out there, thus depleting the Army’s fl eet of planes in Hawaii.
“We had 21 B-17’s at one time,” Short said,
and 9 of those were sent to the Philippines and we were down
to 12, and had to rob 6 of those of parts to keep the others
going through. . . . Th ey were ferrying in the last few months
everything to the Philippines they could.
Still other types of planes “were shipped through [to the
Philippines] on transports.” 120 But it was not only planes that
were being sent out there. Short said that
a few days before December 7, I had a wire from the War
Department asking me if I would be willing to ship forty-eight
75-millimeter guns and 120 30-caliber machine guns to the
Philippines.
Short had agreed. Th e War Department said the planes and guns
would be replaced very soon. 121
He quoted the few telegrams or cable “warnings” he had
received from Washington after assuming command. 122 A War
Department dispatch on July 8 advised him that
deduction from information from numerous sources is that
Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy . . . one of
watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against
maritime provinces of Russia. . . . Opinion is that Jap activity in
the south will be for the present confi ned to seizure and development
of naval army and air bases in Indo China, although
an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely
ruled out. 123
120Ibid., p. 3203.
121Ibid., p. 3204.
122Ibid., pp. 2931–35; part 14, pp. 1326–34, Exhibit No. 32.
123Ibid., part 14, p. 1326, War Department radio, July 8, 1941. Th is telegram,
as transcribed in Roberts Commission Report (ibid., part 24, p. 2164, Exhibit