Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 713
from Washington that Hawaii might be attacked. He explained
that he had been led to think that the Japanese were not going
to attack Hawaii in that he had received no warning such as
had been sent his predecessor in June 1940. At that time, Short
explained in a statement, Marshall alerted then-Commander
General Herron of a possible “trans-Pacifi c raid” scare. 115 Herron
had then taken all necessary precautions. After a month Marshall
authorized Herron to relax the alert provisions except insofar as
they pertained to sabotage and the maintenance of readiness. 116
Short said he had expected that “if the Chief of Staff once again
had information causing him to expect a ‘trans-Pacifi c raid’
against Oahu, he would follow the course he had previously set
as an example.” 117
Short’s Attention Directed Westward
It was obvious that Japan’s forces were heading south around
Indochina and toward southeast Asia—Singapore, Malaya, and
the Dutch East Indies. Th e information sent Short by the War
Department, he said, had always pointed in that direction, toward
“an attack to the Southwest Pacifi c, and including the Netherlands
East Indies.” 118
Short had been told that the Philippines might be threatened.
He knew the United States was doing its best to build up
its Philippine defenses. B-17s were being fl own there from the
States via Hawaii. Th e planes were being outfi tted in Hawaii, and
crews were being trained there. Th en guns and crews, he said,
were being sent in the B-17s on their way to the Philippines. 119
At times, some of Hawaii’s own Army B-17s had even been fl own
115 Ibid., part 7, p. 2930.
116 Ibid., part 15, pp. 1593–1600, Exhibit 52, especially pp. 1597–58.
117 Ibid., part 7, p. 2930.
118 Ibid., p. 3176.
119 Ibid., p. 3217.