Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

712 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Gen. Miles wished to focus War Department thought on the
defeat that could be administered to the Nazi powers. 110
Th is estimate, Short testifi ed, contained no mention of “Japan’s
potential capability against Pearl Harbor” because neither
General Hayes A. Kroner, chief of the intelligence branch, G-2,
“who [according to Short] was responsible for maintaining
information and for the preparation of estimates as to probable
action,” 111 nor others in his branch “had any information which
would lead [them] to believe that they [the Japanese] were capable
of or planned” such an attack. 112 Apparently the Army’s military
intelligence service (G-2) did not expect an attack on Hawaii any
more than had the top Washington offi cials. In other words, Pearl
Harbor was omitted from G-2’s estimates not because it was too
“obvious” to mention, as Miles testifi ed before the committee, 113
but because, even with all the information it had, it did not believe
Japan was capable of making such an attack.
Kroner, who had helped prepare this estimate, remembered
it distinctly because “when the word came through the radio on
that fateful Sunday, December 7, that Japan had attacked Pearl
Harbor, I was sitting in my offi ce in the Munitions Building
reading from this paper.” He felt “that Japan’s potential capability
against Pearl Harbor was left from this estimate because neither
Col. Betts nor I had any information which would lead us to
believe that they were capable of or planned” such an attack. 114
Th e imminence of crisis was becoming apparent in
Washington. Yet the War Department, Short said, failed to relay
that sense of urgency to him. And he had received no intimation
110Ibid., pp. 47–48, testimony of General Kroner.
111Ibid., part 7, pp. 2988–89.
112Ibid., p. 2989.
113Ibid., part 2, pp. 902–03.
114Ibid., part 7, p. 2989. Short testimony. See also part 34, pp. 47–48, Kroner
testimony at Clarke.