Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 711
Short quoted Cramer’s November 25, 1944, comments on
the APHB report:
[S]ince the War Plans Division had received substantial information
from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues
that had this additional information been transmitted to Short
it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent
but that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on
Hawaii. 107
Th e JAG went on to blame Gerow for “Failure to appreciate the
signifi cance” of the intercept messages which were available in
Washington and for “a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and
preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in
an offi cer at the head of the War Plans Division.” 108
From time to time G-2 issued special estimates of the military
situation. Th e Far Eastern parts of these estimates were
always prepared initially by Bratton in the Far Eastern section of
the military intelligence service. Information from the service’s
other geographic sections was incorporated and discussed. Th en
the estimate was presented to General Miles, chief of military
intelligence service, for approval or revision. 109
On November 29 the intelligence branch prepared such an
estimate (I.B.159), which the whole division, including Miles
himself, considered “perhaps the most important we had ever
gotten out,” not so much because of
the danger that we saw from Japan, although danger in that
fi eld was pretty thoroughly discussed, but primarily because
107 Ibid., part 39, p. 265, memorandum.
108Ibid., also part 7, p. 2961.
109Ibid., part 34, p. 45, testimony of Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, chief,
intelligence branch, G-2, before Clarke Inquiry.