Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

710 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
fi ghters, torpedo bombers, antiaircraft guns, machine guns, 102 and
radar equipment. 103 Marshall’s letters dealt primarily with military
“housekeeping” details—the construction of airfi elds, roads,
trails, a recreation camp, antiaircraft artillery, the aircraft warning
service (radar), preparations for air and ground defense, etc; they
contained little information concerning the international situation.
It was the War Department’s responsibility to keep Short
informed, and he said he did receive department messages from
time to time. 104 But those messages were often confl icting and
confusing, especially compared with those sent to Kimmel by the
Navy during this period and then relayed by Kimmel to Short. 105
One charge made against Short was that the attack had taken
him by surprise because he had not been prepared. He pointed
out that even the offi cials in Washington who had had access to
the Japanese intercepts had not expected the attack; rather they
had expected the Japanese to aim at the British and Dutch in
the southwest Pacifi c. When the news reached Washington, top
offi cials from FDR, Hull, and Stimson on down all expressed
surprise.
Army Judge Advocate General ( JAG) Myron C. Cramer was
forced to admit that Short had not been alone in failing to anticipate
an attack. His
nonfeasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the
situation which, although proved faulty by subsequent events,
was . . . made or concurred in by all those offi cers in Hawaii best
qualifi ed to form a sound military opinion. Th at estimate was
that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable. 106
102Ibid., p. 2963. Short statement.
103Ibid., pp. 2969–70, 3157–58. Short testimony.
104Ibid., pp. 2958, 2971.
105Ibid., pp. 2931–35, 2945–46. Short testimony.
106Ibid., part 18, p. 3205, January 27, 1942, memorandum to Marshall.