Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 709
Th e fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major
consideration for us, there can be little question about that. . . .
Please keep clearly in mind in all your negotiations that our mission
is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations
at Hawaii. 96 In this letter, Marshall also discussed the personal
characteristics of Kimmel, who was then taking over command
of the fl eet. 97
Short’s primary responsibility had been diff erent from
Kimmel’s. Kimmel’s task had been to prepare the fl eet for off ensive
action. Short’s principal task, he testifi ed, was defensive,
to defend the Island of Oahu from surface attacks, air attacks,
sabotage, internal disorders such as uprisings, with particular
attention to the defense of Pearl Harbor and of the fl eet when
in harbor,
always of course with the support and assistance of the Navy. 98
During his tour of duty in Hawaii, he and Marshall exchanged
letters (26 pages in the printed hearings), cables, telegrams, and
radiograms (eight pages). 99 Th eir correspondence was relatively
brief, compared with that of Kimmel and Stark during the same
period—113 pages of letters in the printed hearings and 14 pages
of cables, telegrams, and radiograms. 100 In his communications
Short reported shortages of men, 101 planes, B-17s, interceptors,
96Ibid., part 15, pp. 1601–02, Exhibit 53, Marshall’s February 7, 1941, letter
to Short on his assumption of command. See also part 7, p. 3083, Short testimony.
97Ibid., part 15, p. 1601.
98Ibid., part 7, p. 2970.
99Ibid., part 14, pp. 1326–34, Exhibit 32; part 15, pp. 1600–26, Exhibit 53.
100Ibid., part 14, pp. 1395–1409, Exhibit 37; part 16, pp. 2144–57, Exhibit
106.
101Ibid., part 7, p. 2925. Short statement.