Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 707
Kimmel: I don’t understand how it would have interfered in the
slightest degree. . . . I cannot understand why I did not get . . .
that information. 88
On January 21, 1946, after testifying for six days, Admiral
Kimmel was excused by the committee. Kimmel agreed with
Vice Chairman Cooper that he had been given a “full, ample, and
complete opportunity . . . to present my side of the matter.” 89
General Walter C. Short: The Attack
Surprised Pearl Harbor—Also Washington
Finally on January 22, General Short was given an opportunity
to tell his story. At the time of the attack, Short had been commanding
general, Hawaiian department. Like Kimmel, he had
appeared before the Roberts Commission and had to appear there
alone, without counsel. Also like Kimmel, he had not been permitted
to hear or cross-examine other commission witnesses. 90 Short
had not even been allowed to hear or cross-examine witnesses
before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB), as Kimmel had
before the Navy Court of Inquiry (NCI), the Navy’s counterpart.
And he was not allowed to see the Japanese MAGIC intercepts,
copies of which the APHB obtained on October 6, 1944, at the
very end of its hearings. 91 Short’s military counsel, Brigadier
General Th omas H. Green, was eventually allowed to see them,
although not to comment on them to Short; Green’s role was
limited to giving Short advice. 92 Th e APHB did furnish Short
88 Ibid., p. 2876.
89 Ibid., p. 2915.
90 Ibid., part 7, p. 2921, Short testimony.
91 Ibid., part 28, pp. 946–47.
92 Ibid., part 7, p. 3155, Short testimony. See also part 29, pp. 2435–38.