Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 703
Kimmel: Th at would have been a little late. . . .
Ferguson: Th at would have also been late after the Japanese
had gone into Borneo and Java, would it not?
Kimmel: Yes, sir.
Ferguson: Well, now, was the Marshall operation and its value
contingent upon it being undertaken before the Japanese had
breached the Malay Barrier?
Kimmel: Well, certainly before they had had a chance to take
those land areas which comprise the Malay Barrier. It had to
draw the forces away in time, before they had conquered that
country and before they had gone down there really.
Ferguson: Well, now, is that why you were interested in the
movement and why the United States was interested in the
movement south? . . . And did you also want to know what you
were to do in case you were sure that they were going south?
Kimmel: Yes, sir.
Ferguson: And did you ever fi nd that out prior to the attack
on the 7th?
Kimmel: What I was to do? . . . No, sir; not defi nitely.
Ferguson: Well, now you come back to those words “Not defi -
nitely.” Did you ever fi nd any information on it?
Kimmel: No. . . . I wanted to know what we were to do. I did
not fi nd out. 79
Ferguson then showed Kimmel the message from U.S.
Ambassador John G. Winant in London announcing the presence
of two Japanese convoys of about 60 ships off Cambodia
79 Ibid., part 6, pp. 2864–65.