Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

702 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
advisability of this Government’s making such an approach at
this time.
Ferguson (continuing): Now, that is dated on December the
4th, 1941. . . . Now, from all that you have learned, wherein
the messages were intercepted, and was known in Washington,
have you any doubt that war was imminent and that we knew
we were going to war?
Kimmel: I have no doubt, sir.
Ferguson: Well, then, did you get this message . . . [indicating]
that we did not want the American public to know that we
were going to war?
Kimmel: I received no such message; no, sir. . . .
Ferguson: Well, you were told . . . you were to do nothing that
would arouse the population of Hawaii to indicate that we
were going to war?
Kimmel: Th at was contained in messages which came to me;
yes, sir. 78
Ferguson: Now, would it be correct to say that your fi rst and
your chief objective in the event of an American-Japanese war
was an attack upon the Marshall Islands to divert the Japanese
from the Malayan barrier which comprised vital possessions of
the Dutch and the British, who would be our allies?
Kimmel: Yes, sir. . . . Th at was if and when we got into the war.
Ferguson: Well, now, would the attack on the Marshalls
accomplish the chief purpose of the American war plan that
you then had, if that attack occurred after Singapore had fallen
to the Japanese?
78 Ibid., part 6, pp. 2875–76. Readings from State Department December 4,
1941, document, part 15, pp. 1741–43, Exhibit 74A.