Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

698 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
the Marshalls in the event the United States should implement
its direct and specifi c warning to oppose a Japanese movement
against the Malay Barrier?
Kimmel: Yes, I think they probably would expect attacks on
the Marshalls. 70
Ferguson: Did you know then that the presence of this Japanese
force before the approaches to Singapore required the responsible
leadership in Washington to act immediately or to back
down from the former position it had taken with Japan as of
Sunday, August the 17th, 1941?
Kimmel: No, sir; I did not.
Ferguson: Well, if you had known that, would this fact that
they were moving toward the Kra Peninsula [have] made a difference
with your action? . . . Well, . . . you had nothing before
you, had you, that the United States Government intended to
back down from any stand or any policy that it had?
Kimmel: No, sir; I did not.
Ferguson: Well, then, if the policy was such that we should
have anticipated that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula it
would mean war with America, should we not have then at the
same time anticipated a co-attack on America?
Kimmel: Th at would appear to be reasonable; yes, sir.
Ferguson: Well, do you know why no one seems to have anticipated
that if they attacked the Kra Peninsula they would not
also attack America at the same time?
Kimmel: No, sir, I do not.
70Ibid., pp. 2869–70. For Stark’s November 25, 1941, letter, see part 16, pp.
2223–25.