Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 697
Kimmel: I would have to know all the circumstances fi rst. 67
Ferguson then asked Kimmel if he had ever “been advised
what the task of the Pacifi c Fleet should be in the event of an
outbreak of war in the Pacifi c which did not involve a Japanese
attack directly on American possessions.” 68 Th is was precisely
what Kimmel had been trying to fi nd out for some time—without
success.
Ferguson: Well, were you fully aware on November the 27th
that the Japanese had concentrated for an attack upon the
Malay barrier?
Kimmel: I was so informed. . . .
Ferguson: Well, were you aware that such an attack, even the
obvious preparation for it, was a direct defi ance of the formal
and explicit warning against such movement given by the
United States [August 17, after the FDR-Churchill meeting
at Argentia]?
Kimmel: I did not know of the formal and explicit warning
given by the United States. 69
Ferguson: You were advised by Admiral Stark [Stark letter of
November 25] after he had a conference at the White House
that he was damned if he knew what the United States was
going to do should Japan attack the Malay Barrier without
at the same time attacking possessions of the United States.
. . . Now, between the date of that letter and its receipt you
had been instructed, had you not, to prepare to attack the
Marshalls after Japan had committed an overt act against the
United States. . . . Now, in the manner of ordinary naval strategy,
would the Japanese expect an attack by the Pacifi c Fleet on
67Ibid., pp. 2877–78.
68Ibid., p. 2877. Kimmel testimony.
69 Ibid., p. 2868.