Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 695
British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the
British and Dutch East Indies. Th e Philippines are now being
reinforced.
Marshall and Stark reaffi rmed that the “basic military policies
and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff
Conversations remain sound. Th e primary objective of the two
nations is the defeat of Germany.”
In this memorandum Marshall and Stark urged that war
between the United States and Japan “should be avoided while
building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as
Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to
the United States is of very great importance.” Stark and Marshall
closed with a clear and unmistakable joint recommendation:
“Th at no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.” 64
On November 18 Kimmel was advised that “[u]ntil international
conditions on and subsequent to 25 Nov. become defi ned
and clarifi ed . . . any further direct or great circle routing between
Hawaii and Philippines should not repeat not be used.” And he
was authorized to place a Dutch ship, Bloemfontein, in a convoy
with American-fl ag vessels. 65
Ferguson: Do you know why they used the date there “subsequent
to November 25”? . . . Did you ever know that we had
a message that we intercepted from the Japs showing that the
dead line [sic] date [for the Japanese ambassadors to complete
their negotiations with the United States] was the 25th of
November?
64 Ibid., part 16, pp. 2222–23, Marshall/Stark November 5, 1941, memorandum
to FDR. Copy sent Kimmel with Stark’s letter of November 14, 1941 (Ibid.,
part 16, pp. 2220–21; see also pp. 2222–23).
65 Ibid., part 14, p. 1404, OPNAV November 18, 1941 Message #181705.