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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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694 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

unless there is some agreement between Japan <strong>and</strong> China—<strong>and</strong><br />

just now that seems remote.” 59<br />

By this time, the Japanese were “rapidly completing withdrawal<br />

from world shipping routes.” 60 Th e United States also<br />

issued orders to ships to avoid areas where they might encounter<br />

Japanese ships. On October 16, 1941, all U.S. merchant ships, 61<br />

<strong>and</strong> on October 17, 1941, all U.S.-fl ag shipping 62 were directed<br />

to keep to the southward through the Torres Straits between the<br />

northern coast <strong>of</strong> Australia <strong>and</strong> the southern shores <strong>of</strong> the isl<strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> New Guinea, <strong>and</strong> to keep “well clear <strong>of</strong> Orange [ Japanese]<br />

m<strong>and</strong>ates taking maximum advantage <strong>of</strong> Dutch <strong>and</strong> Australian<br />

patrolled areas.” By October 23, ships carrying U.S. Army <strong>and</strong><br />

Navy troops <strong>and</strong> military cargo were being escorted both ways<br />

between Honolulu <strong>and</strong> Manila. 63<br />

On November 5, 1941, Marshall <strong>and</strong> Stark had sent a joint<br />

memor<strong>and</strong>um to the president. Th ere they admitted that the U.S.<br />

Fleet in the Pacifi c was then “inferior to the Japanese Fleet <strong>and</strong><br />

cannot undertake an unlimited strategic <strong>of</strong>f ensive in the Western<br />

Pacifi c.” To do so<br />

it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing practically<br />

all naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to<br />

local defense forces. . . . Th e result <strong>of</strong> withdrawals from the<br />

Atlantic <strong>of</strong> Naval <strong>and</strong> merchant strength might well cause the<br />

United Kingdom to lose the Battle <strong>of</strong> the Atlantic in the near<br />

future. . . . Th e only current plans for war against Japan in the<br />

Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the<br />

59Ibid., part 16, pp. 2212–13, Stark’s September 23, 1941, letter to Kimmel.<br />

60Ibid., part 14, p. 1401, OPNAV August 14, 1941, Dispatch #142155 to<br />

CINCAF, CINCPAC, CINCLANT.<br />

61Ibid., part 14, p. 1402, CNO October 16, 1941, Dispatch #162300.<br />

62Ibid., p. 1403, OPNAV October 17, 1941, Message #162258 to the Philippines,<br />

CINCAF COM.12.<br />

63Ibid., p. 1403, OPNAV October 23, 1941 Message #222250 to comm<strong>and</strong>ers<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>, Manila, <strong>and</strong> San Francisco Naval Districts.

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