Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 693
government wanted to confi ne the war to the Atlantic; “we did
not want to go into the Pacifi c.” He thought the United States
was doing all it could to keep out of war in the Pacifi c. Prior to
December 7 he had not believed “that war was imminent. . . . or
that we were in any way forcing the war.” So he had not considered
that “the Japanese would expect us to take any such action in
the Pacifi c as had been taken in the Atlantic.” 58
On September 23, 1941, Stark replied to Kimmel. For the
present, he wrote, “the president has issued shooting orders only
for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacifi c sub-area. Th e situation in
the Pacifi c generally,” Stark said, “is far diff erent from what it is in
the Atlantic.” Kimmel’s “existing orders to escorts are appropriate
under the present situation. Th ey are also in accordance with Art.
723 U.S. Navy Regulations: no orders should be given to shoot at
the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article.
. . . Art.723, U.S.N.R. reads as follows:
Th e use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against
anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal.
Th e right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs
to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it
includes the protection of the State, its honor, and its possessions,
and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary
violence, actual or impending.
Stark talked with Hull before sending this letter and added a
postscript. Hull asked that the letter be held “very secret.” Stark
summed up Hull’s comments by saying “that conversations with
the Japs have practically reached an impasse,” and Stark could see
no chance for a “settlement and peace in the Far East until and
58 Ibid., part 6, pp. 2881–82.