Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

692 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Because of the delicate nature of our present Pacifi c relations,
Kimmel felt Stark was “the only one who can answer this
question.” 55
Kimmel had also asked “what to do about submarine contacts
off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity.” His orders at that time were
“to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless you are in the defensive
sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to
be attacked?” 56
In his letter Kimmel expressed fear that FDR’s emphasis
on the Atlantic might lead to “a possible further weakening of
this Fleet. A strong Pacifi c Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to
Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation” to attack. Before the
JCC Kimmel testifi ed that he believed the maintenance of the
“status quo” in the Pacifi c was
almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must
[not] be reduced, and, in the event of actual hostilities, must be
increased if we are to undertake a bold off ensive. . . . Until we
can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet
we are not secure in the Pacifi c—and the Pacifi c is still very
much a part of the world situation. 57
Ferguson asked Kimmel whether he had known that the
Japanese ambassador to the United States, the Japanese foreign
minister, and Japanese press had indicated that they expected the
United States to proceed in the Pacifi c as it had in the Atlantic
with a “shoot-on-sight” order. Kimmel said he had never heard
anything to that eff ect. As a matter of fact, because of the correspondence
he had had to the eff ect that we “did not want to
tackle two wars at once,” he had gotten the impression that the
55Ibid. See also part 6, p. 2861, Kimmel testimony.
56Ibid., part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to Stark.
57Ibid., part 6, pp. 2823–24. See also part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to
Stark.