Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

01.01.2013 Views

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 691 I would have been unable to do anything until I got orders to move. 53 On September 11, 1941, President Roosevelt had issued a “shoot-on-sight order” to U.S. Navy ships aimed at German ships and submarines operating within areas in the Atlantic considered “vital to American defense.” Kimmel noted that similar orders had been issued the Southeast Pacifi c Force “for surface raiders east of 100° west,” that is, about 700 miles off the western coast of South America. Kimmel wrote Stark on September 12 asking whether this “shoot-on-sight order” applied also to the rest of the Pacifi c. 54 Th e threat of Japanese action, Kimmel wrote, coupled with current rumors of U.S.-Japanese rapproachement [sic] and the absence of any specifi c reference to the Pacifi c in the president’s speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what my situation out here is. Kimmel asked Stark specifi cally, What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than Atlantic and Southeast Pacifi c sub-areas? Th is is particularly pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy from interference; to avoid use of force if possible, but to use it if necessary. Th ese orders, at least by implication, preclude taking the off ensive. Shouldn’t I now change them to direct off ensive measures against German and Italian raiders? 53 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2866. 54 Ibid., part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel September 12, 1941, letter to Stark.

692 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy Because of the delicate nature of our present Pacifi c relations, Kimmel felt Stark was “the only one who can answer this question.” 55 Kimmel had also asked “what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity.” His orders at that time were “to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless you are in the defensive sea area. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?” 56 In his letter Kimmel expressed fear that FDR’s emphasis on the Atlantic might lead to “a possible further weakening of this Fleet. A strong Pacifi c Fleet is unquestionably a deterrent to Japan—a weaker one may be an invitation” to attack. Before the JCC Kimmel testifi ed that he believed the maintenance of the “status quo” in the Pacifi c was almost entirely a matter of the strength of this Fleet. It must [not] be reduced, and, in the event of actual hostilities, must be increased if we are to undertake a bold off ensive. . . . Until we can keep a force here strong enough to meet the Japanese Fleet we are not secure in the Pacifi c—and the Pacifi c is still very much a part of the world situation. 57 Ferguson asked Kimmel whether he had known that the Japanese ambassador to the United States, the Japanese foreign minister, and Japanese press had indicated that they expected the United States to proceed in the Pacifi c as it had in the Atlantic with a “shoot-on-sight” order. Kimmel said he had never heard anything to that eff ect. As a matter of fact, because of the correspondence he had had to the eff ect that we “did not want to tackle two wars at once,” he had gotten the impression that the 55Ibid. See also part 6, p. 2861, Kimmel testimony. 56Ibid., part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to Stark. 57Ibid., part 6, pp. 2823–24. See also part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to Stark.

Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 2 691<br />

I would have been unable to do anything until I got orders to<br />

move. 53<br />

On September 11, 1941, President Roosevelt had issued a<br />

“shoot-on-sight order” to U.S. Navy ships aimed at German ships<br />

<strong>and</strong> submarines operating within areas in the Atlantic considered<br />

“vital to American defense.” Kimmel noted that similar orders<br />

had been issued the Southeast Pacifi c Force “for surface raiders<br />

east <strong>of</strong> 100° west,” that is, about 700 miles <strong>of</strong>f the western coast<br />

<strong>of</strong> South America. Kimmel wrote Stark on September 12 asking<br />

whether this “shoot-on-sight order” applied also to the rest <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Pacifi c. 54<br />

Th e threat <strong>of</strong> Japanese action, Kimmel wrote,<br />

coupled with current rumors <strong>of</strong> U.S.-Japanese rapproachement<br />

[sic] <strong>and</strong> the absence <strong>of</strong> any specifi c reference to the Pacifi c in<br />

the president’s speech, leaves me in some doubt as to just what<br />

my situation out here is.<br />

Kimmel asked Stark specifi cally,<br />

What orders to shoot should be issued for areas other than<br />

Atlantic <strong>and</strong> Southeast Pacifi c sub-areas? Th is is particularly<br />

pertinent to our present escorts for ships proceeding to the Far<br />

East. So far, my orders to them have been to protect their convoy<br />

from interference; to avoid use <strong>of</strong> force if possible, but to<br />

use it if necessary. Th ese orders, at least by implication, preclude<br />

taking the <strong>of</strong>f ensive. Shouldn’t I now change them to direct<br />

<strong>of</strong>f ensive measures against German <strong>and</strong> Italian raiders?<br />

53 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 6, p. 2866.<br />

54 Ibid., part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel September 12, 1941, letter to Stark.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!