Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

690 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
51 Ibid.
Ferguson: Well, were you aware from your own judgment,
like Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner have stated here, that
Anglo-Dutch-American embargoes on Japan oil supplies,
regardless of their justifi cation for such embargoes, constituted
an actual and a logical cause of war with Japan?
Kimmel: Well, I thought that the embargoes would irritate
Japan considerably and I knew about the embargoes.
Ferguson: Well, did you think it would irritate them enough,
as has been stated by Admiral Stark, that we should have anticipated
war over that?
Kimmel: Not necessarily; no. 51
Ferguson: Well, now, were you advised that on August 17, when
the president returned from the Atlantic conference [with
Churchill], that the president called the Japanese Ambassador
to the White House and told him in diplomatic language, and
it was rather blunt and in writing, that a Japanese threat or
show of force against the Malay Barrier or any movement in
the Pacifi c would compel the United States immediately to
take any and all steps necessary to protect our rights?
Kimmel: No, sir, I did not know about that. 52
Ferguson: Now, did that task [diverting enemy strength away
from the Malay Barrier as prescribed in the U.S. war plan]
depend upon your fi rst knowing that America was in the war
by virtue of an attack or declaration of war?
Kimmel: It did. I had no authority to act until I received defi -
nite word from my Government. . . . Had the Japanese made an
attack on the Kra Peninsula, had they made an attack on Java,
52 Ibid., p. 2867. See also Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, “Oral Statement
Handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)
on August 17, 1941,” pp. 556–57.