Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 689
Kimmel: I did not know that he had made any such
statements. 47
Ferguson: Now if you would have had that information in relation
to Admiral Turner’s conversation . . . never disputed as far
as Turner was concerned and he was never called on the carpet,
or it was never taken up with him that he was wrong . . . if you
had known of that would you then have known the policy of
America in case of an attack upon the Malay Barrier?
Kimmel: It would have been most helpful to me and if I had
known all the circumstances and the fact that that was the policy
of the Government; yes, it would have helped immensely. 48
Ferguson: Well, were you ever told that Admiral Stark was
called to the White House by the president on July 24 and
that then he heard a statement by the president to Japan to the
eff ect . . . that if Japan attempted to get Dutch oil by force, the
British and Dutch would fi ght and there would then result a
most serious situation between the United States and Japan?
Kimmel: I don’t remember ever having been informed of that
conversation. . . . No, sir. 49
Ferguson: Well, were you advised that responsible leadership
was intercepting secret Japanese messages wherein the Japanese
Ambassador was advising his Government that it must expect
armed opposition from Great Britain and the United States
should Japan move against the Malay Barrier?
Kimmel: I was never informed of that. 50
47 Ibid., part 6, p. 2866.
48 Ibid., p. 2867; see Turner testimony re his July 21, 1941 conversation with
Nomura, ibid., part 4, pp. 2041–42.
49 Ibid., part 6, p. 2867. See also Department of State, Papers Relating to the
Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 527–28.
50 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2868.