Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

688 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
imaginary line connecting the Malay Peninsula, via Sumatra, Java,
and the various islands to the east extending to Bathurst Island,
just off the north-central coast of Australia. When Ferguson’s
turn came to question Kimmel, the senator devoted most of
the time to trying to fi nd out whether information available in
Washington had been relayed to him, what the United States’
interest in the Malay Barrier was, and what commitments, if any,
the United States may have made to the British and Dutch.
When Ferguson questioned Kimmel he summarized Turner’s
earlier JCC testimony on the situation in the western Pacifi c.
Turner (Navy War Plans) had said that he
believed that we would be attacked, defi nitely . . . [i]n the
Philippines and if we were attacked in the Philippines I knew it
would be war. I thought it would be war if we were not attacked,
I thought it would be war if they attacked the British and the
Dutch, but there would have been some delays possibly.
Ferguson said,
In other words, if they [the Japanese] attacked the British and
the Dutch alone you thought it meant war and [you made] a
distinction that if they attacked the Dutch, the British, and the
Americans at the Philippines it did mean war.
Turner had agreed with Ferguson’s summary. 46
Ferguson: [W]ere you aware that Admiral Turner had
informed the Japanese Ambassador . . . July 23 or 24, that the
United States would not tolerate, in view of its policy of aiding
Britain and its interpretation of self-defense, a Japanese threat
to the Malay Barrier?
46 Ibid., part 4, p. 2044, italics added.