Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 687
go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will
be damned if I know. I wish I did. Th e only thing I do know is
that we may do most anything and that’s the only thing I know
to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more
likely to be “anything.” 42
Later when Gearhart questioned Kimmel, he supported
Kimmel’s reasoning that Washington expected the Japanese to
move against the Philippines and/or southeast Asia, thousands of
miles west of Hawaii. Gearhart considered this consistent with
the jurisprudential interpretation “ejusdem generis rule,” namely
that “A general statement followed by a specifi c limitation, always
limits the interpretation in the courts to the things of the same
character of the specifi c things mentioned.” 43 In other words, the
general statement in the November 27 “war warning” to the eff ect
that “an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few
days” was limited by the specifi c statement that followed indicating
“an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Th ai
or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo.” 44
Kimmel Had Been Told Little or Nothing
re U.S.-British Military Agreements and
Japanese Threat in Southeast Pacific
Th e U.S. Pacifi c Fleet’s task under the war plan was to support
the forces of the “Associated Powers,” i.e., the United States,
the British Commonwealth, and their allies, “in the Far East by
diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier,” 45 —the
42Ibid., part 16, pp. 2224–25.
43Ibid., part 6, p. 2858.
44Ibid., p. 2857. Gearhart quotes from the Navy’s November 27 “war warning”
(Ibid., part 14, p. 1406), NCO #272337.
45Ibid., part 18, pp. 2875-2941, Exhibit 129, Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow
No. 5 (WPL-46). For U.S. Pacifi c Fleet’s task, see chapter II. Section 1, Task
“a.”