Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

48 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
in foreign waters, would seem to run counter to his third-term
campaign statements. . . .
Finally, when it became fully apparent that he had no intention
of accepting my recommendations [to permit the Fleet
to return to the west coast], I [Richardson] said to him very
deliberately: “Mr. President, I feel that I must tell you that the
senior offi cers in the Navy do not have the trust and confi dence
in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for the
successful prosecution of a war in the Pacifi c.”
Th e president, with a look of pained surprise on his face, said:
“Joe, you just don’t understand that this is an election year and
there are certain things that can’t be done, no matter what, until
the election is over and won.” 42
Financing of British Arms Purchases Assured
Th e president was also seriously concerned at this time with
how the British were to fi nance their arms purchases. Th e British
treasury was fast being depleted. Th ere was a “growing sense of
urgency in London.” 43 It was diffi cult for them to know how to
proceed. “Earlier in the year the president had shown an interest
in regard to British assets in Latin America, including the
Argentine Railways. . . . He came back to it again in mid-October
in a talk with the British Ambassador. He thought that by this
means the fi nancial crisis might be postponed for a month or
two.” 44
On October 14 Lord Lothian, the British ambassador, asked
Roosevelt and Morgenthau when British treasury representative
Phillips might return to continue discussions about Britain’s
42 Ibid., pp. 434–35.
43 Hall, North American Supply, p. 253.
44 Ibid., p. 249.