Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

686 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
On November 7, Stark wrote Kimmel: “Th ings seem to be
moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacifi c. Just when it will
break, no one can tell.” Stark’s “principal reaction” was that “it
continually gets ‘worser and worser’! A month may see, literally,
most anything.” 39
On November 14, Stark sent Kimmel a copy of the November
5 memorandum he and Marshall had sent the president. 40 In that
memorandum, Stark and Marshall had written:
Th e only current plans for war against Japan in the Far East
are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British
and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British
and Dutch East Indies. . . . War between the United States and
Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in
the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens
territories whose security to the United States is of very great
importance. 41
Th e closest thing to a reply that Kimmel received to his several
requests for information as to how the United States would
respond if the British and Dutch were attacked was Stark’s postscript
to a November 25, 1941, letter: “Neither [FDR nor Hull]
would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many
angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing
thing that could happen to us.” Some think such an attack
“likely,” Stark said, but he did not “give it the weight” others did.
He “generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed
against Russia. . . . [Rather he looked] for an advance into
Th ailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.” He
said he wouldn’t
39Ibid., part 33, p. 1360.
40Ibid., part 16, pp. 2220–21. Stark November 14, 1941, letter, enclosing copy
of Marshall/Stark November 5, 1941, “Memorandum for the President” (part
14, pp. 1061–62).
41Ibid., pp. 2222–23, italics added.