Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 685
Commander-in-Chief, Pacifi c Fleet to modify, adapt, or even
re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current
concepts.
He asked that he “be immediately informed of all important
developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means
available.” 36
During the summer of 1941 after Germany, Britain’s enemy,
had attacked the U.S.S.R., which then became Britain’s new ally,
the concern became whether or not Japan, Germany’s ally under
the Tri-Partite Alliance, might attack Russia’s maritime provinces
on the Asiatic coast west of Japan, just north of Korea. Kimmel
continued to press Stark for information.
On July 26 Kimmel asked specifi cally about “the U.S. attitude
towards Russian participation in the war.” What role if any would
the Pacifi c Fleet have to play
between the U.S. and Russia if and when we become active
participants. . . . (1) Will England declare war on Japan if
Japanese attack Maritime Provinces? (2) If answer to (1) is in
the affi rmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in
case of attack on N.E.I. [Netherlands East Indies] or [British]
Singapore? (3) If answer to (2) is in the affi rmative, are plans
being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.? 37
In October Kimmel learned from a traveler who had visited
“Singapore, Manila, Java, Dutch East Indies, Australia and New
Zealand” that “if Japan attacks Russia the British Empire will
declare war on Japan. . . . [T]he Dutch East Indies would follow
Great Britain.” On October 29, Kimmel asked Stark, “If they do
embark on such an adventure and Britain and the Dutch East
Indies declare war on Japan, what will we do?” 38
36Ibid., part 16, p. 2238, Kimmel letter to Stark, May 26, 1941.
37Ibid., pp. 2239–42.
38Ibid., p. 2251.