Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

684 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 so far
as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.
Th us in two separate dispatches I was ordered by the Navy
Department to have the Pacifi c Fleet ready to move against the
Marshalls upon the expected outbreak of war in the Far East.
Th is was a determinative factor in the most diffi cult and vital
decisions I had to make thereafter. Th ere was not a hint in these
two dispatches of any danger in the Hawaiian area. 35
On the one hand, Kimmel had been instructed to “Undertake
no off ensive action until Japan has committed an overt act,” that
is to sit and wait. And on the other hand he had been ordered to
continue preparing to go on the off ensive against the Japanese in
the Marshall Islands—as called for in the war plan.
United States-British Military Agreement?
In view of this country’s policy of cooperating with the British,
it was imperative that the fi eld commanders be advised of any
U.S. agreements or commitments that would involve them and
the military forces under them. During the months preceding
the attack, Kimmel had questioned Stark repeatedly as to what
the United States would do and what Kimmel’s responsibilities as
commander-in-chief of the Pacifi c Fleet would be if the Japanese
attacked the British and Dutch in southeast Asia without striking
U.S. territory. To help him make his own judgments, he pressed
Stark to keep him posted as to diplomatic and military aff airs
aff ecting the situation.
On May 26, 1941, Kimmel wrote Stark:
Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives,
even though necessarily late at times, would enable the
35 Ibid., pp. 2525–26.