Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

682 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46. 28
Washington’s attention was apparently focused on southeast
Asia, and Kimmel’s attention was also directed there by this “war
warning.”
Kimmel testifi ed that also on November 27, the Navy
Department “suggested that I send from the immediate vicinity
of Pearl Harbor [to Wake and Midway] the carriers of the fl eet
which constituted the fl eet’s main striking defense against an air
attack.” Th at same day, he said, the war and navy departments
suggested that we send from the island of Oahu, 50 percent
of the Army’s resources in pursuit planes. . . . In these circumstances
no reasonable man in my position would consider that
the “war warning” was intended to suggest the likelihood of an
attack in the Hawaiian area. 29
Kimmel found his pre-attack instructions most confusing,
presenting him with a “Do-Don’t” situation. Th e November 29
Navy message had told him that “the United States desires that
Japan commit the fi rst overt act. . . . [U]ndertake such reconnaissance
and other measures as you deem necessary but these
measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil
population or disclose intent. . . . Undertake no off ensive action
until Japan has committed an overt act.” 30 Army Message #472 of
November 27 had given similar instructions to Short. 31
Kimmel explained:
28Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, Navy Department Dispatch 272337.
29Ibid., part 6, p. 2520.
30Ibid., part 14, p. 1407, CNO Message #290110, dated November 29, drafted
November 28, 1941.
31Ibid., p. 1328, Army Message #472, November 27, 1941.