Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 681
In part two of this dispatch, Tokyo told Berlin that one
particular clause in the note the United States had handed the
Japanese ambassadors on November 26 was especially “insulting.”
Th at clause meant in eff ect that “in case the United States enters
the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be
allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy” in accord with
their Tri-Partite Alliance.
Th is clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to fi nd
any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is
more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they
conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and
China—they did so repeatedly. Th erefore, it is clear that the
United States is now in collusion with those nations and has
decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an
enemy. 26
Kimmel said the Navy Department had realized that “the high
point in the crisis in Japanese-American aff airs would be reached
when the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26
was received and the Department had been looking for it ever
since that date.” 27
Kimmel’s Instructions: Carry out War Plan 46
Stark’s November 27 “war warning” had advised Kimmel
that
an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few
days. Th e number and equipment of Japanese troops and the
organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition
against either the Philippines Th ai or Kra Peninsula or
26Ibid., pp. 2854–55. See also ibid., part 12, pp. 205–06, Japanese Message
#986.
27Ibid., part 6, p. 2549.