Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

680 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
United States relations apparent in the intercepted dispatches.” 22
He itemized some of the dispatches he had not seen at the time
but had since learned about. For instance, there was the intercept
concerning the “concealed Japanese plans which automatically
went into eff ect on November 29.” 23 Th e Navy Department had
also known, Kimmel said, of the false weather broadcast, “East
Wind Rain,” indicating a break in Japanese-U.S. relations. 24 He
cited several intercepts that had been picked up, decoded, and
translated during this period asking the Japanese consulate
in Hawaii for information on “the berthings of ships in Pearl
Harbor.” 25 Th ese intercepts, Kimmel said, were only some of
the signifi cant indications of crisis that had been available in
Washington between November 27 and December 7.
When questioning Kimmel, Gearhart quoted a two-part
Tokyo-Berlin message of November 30 that had been intercepted,
decrypted, and translated, and that had been available
in Washington on December 1. In that message Japan reassured
Germany that “the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the
Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy.” Th e
United States had taken the stand, Tokyo told Berlin in part one
of this dispatch, that
22 Ibid.
As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany
and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations
between Japan and the United States. . . . [I]t has become
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government
could no longer continue negotiations with the United States.
It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would
inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
23 Ibid., p. 2547.
24 Ibid., p. 2549.
25 Ibid., p. 2547.