Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

678 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
warned Kimmel (March 3, 1941) that the enactment of lendlease
would make the supply situation still worse; it would bring
about an “enormous—almost astronomical”—demand for ordnance
supplies for the British Navy and Allies. 15 As a matter of
fact, 1,900 planes were sent abroad from February 1 to December
1, 1941 (about 1,750 of them going to the British), and 1,900
antiaircraft guns were distributed under lend-lease (some 1,500
of them going to the British). Th at meant 1,900 fewer planes and
1,900 fewer antiaircraft guns available to improve Pearl Harbor’s
defenses. 16
Kimmel’s Dearth of Information
Kimmel may have found it diffi cult to obtain clear instructions
and to procure the men and materiel needed to build the
fl eet to fi ghting strength, but probably his chief complaint was
lack of information. In his dual capacity as “the commander in
chief of the United States Fleet and the commander in chief of
the Pacifi c Fleet,” he said he felt he was “entitled to every scrap of
information they had in Washington.” It need not have been supplied
in full, he said; it could have been sent in summarized form.
But he felt he was entitled to “all the essential information which
had to do with the Pacifi c situation.” 17 According to Kimmel, he
had received during July 1941 at least seven dispatches quoting
intercepted Japanese messages. As a matter of fact, he had been
given the impression that they were sending him all the important
information available. Yet little or none of the information
gleaned from later intercepts was furnished Kimmel. 18
15 Ibid., part 6 pp. 2499–500, Nimitz March 3, 1941, letter to Kimmel.
16 Ibid., part 10, pp. 4873–75, War Department February 14, 1946 memorandum
furnished the Joint Congressional Committee at request of Seth W.
Richardson, general counsel.
17 Ibid., part 6, p. 2628.
18 Ibid., p. 2540.