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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 2 677<br />

vehemently against still further transfers, <strong>and</strong> in that he had<br />

prevailed. 11<br />

Kimmel’s dilemma, given the situation, had been to decide<br />

how best to employ the fl eet’s limited ships, planes, antiaircraft<br />

guns, ammunition, other equipment <strong>and</strong> supplies, as well as his<br />

men so as to fulfi ll his several responsibilities. Under questioning<br />

by the committee’s legal staff Kimmel again reviewed the<br />

situation that faced him as comm<strong>and</strong>er <strong>of</strong> the Pacifi c Fleet—not<br />

only the shortages <strong>of</strong> men <strong>and</strong> supplies but also the confl icting<br />

<strong>and</strong> confusing intelligence he had received, the need to develop<br />

a trained force <strong>of</strong> fi ghting men, <strong>and</strong> the diffi culty <strong>of</strong> reconciling<br />

Washington’s recommendations for still further reductions in<br />

fl eet strength with his instructions to prepare for <strong>of</strong>f ensive action<br />

as called for under the war plan, WPL-46.<br />

Kimmel said he had written CNO Stark <strong>and</strong> Chief <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Bureau <strong>of</strong> Navigation Nimitz again <strong>and</strong> again <strong>of</strong> the dangerous<br />

conditions created by the shortage <strong>of</strong> qualifi ed aviators <strong>and</strong> “the<br />

continued detachment <strong>of</strong> qualifi ed <strong>of</strong>fi cers <strong>and</strong> enlisted men”<br />

needed if the fl eet were “to reach the high state <strong>of</strong> effi ciency<br />

dem<strong>and</strong>ed by a campaign.” He could not spare “any considerable<br />

number <strong>of</strong> qualifi ed <strong>of</strong>fi cers from the Fleet without assuming an<br />

enormous risk.” 12 Every action has its cost, <strong>of</strong> course. Th e transfer<br />

<strong>of</strong> ships to the Atlantic in mid-1941 reduced the strength <strong>of</strong><br />

the Pacifi c Fleet. Passing 26 B-17s, the planes most suitable for<br />

reconnaissance, 13 through Hawaii on their way to the Philippines,<br />

outfi tting them with crews, guns <strong>and</strong> ammunition, did not improve<br />

<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>’s reconnaissance capabilities; at times it even reduced<br />

them as, Short testifi ed later, Hawaii had had to relinquish some<br />

<strong>of</strong> its own B-17s for the benefi t <strong>of</strong> the Philippines. 14 Nimitz had<br />

11 Ibid., part 6, p. 2505.<br />

12 Ibid., p. 2499, Kimmel letter to Nimitz, February 16, 1941.<br />

13 Ibid., p. 2731.<br />

14 Ibid., part 7, pp. 2970, 3203.

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