Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Foreign Relations in an Election Year 47
Richardson then took up the question of returning the Fleet,
except for a Hawaiian detachment, to the Pacifi c coast for training
and outfi tting. “Th e president stated that the fl eet was retained
in the Hawaiian area in order to exercise a restraining infl uence
on the actions of Japan.” Admiral Richardson doubted it would
have that eff ect, for the Japanese military government knew full
well that the U.S. Fleet in Hawaii was undermanned and unprepared
for war. However, the president insisted: “Despite what you
believe, I know that the presence of the fl eet in the Hawaiian
area, has had and is now having, a restraining infl uence on the
actions of Japan.” 40
Richardson
asked the president if we were going to enter the war. He replied
that if the Japanese attacked Th ailand, or the Kra Peninsula
[the southeast Asian peninsula at the southern tip of which
Singapore is located], or the Dutch East Indies we would not
enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he
doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could
not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued
and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they
would make a mistake and we would enter the war. 41
“Th e discussion [with the president] waxed hot and heavy.” In
Richardson’s words,
[I] could not help but detect that re-election political considerations,
rather than long-range military considerations, were the
controlling factor in the president’s thinking. It was less than a
month before the 1940 Presidential Election, and the president
was reluctant to make any commitment to increase the number
of men in the Navy, which, due to the location of naval ships
40 Ibid., pp. 425, 427.
41 Ibid., p. 427; Richardson’s testimony before the Joint Congressional
Committee in 1945, as related in his book.