Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

676 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
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When the committee reconvened on January 14, 1946, there
were still several important witnesses to be heard—notably Short
and Kimmel, Saff ord, and the Army and Navy couriers Kramer
and Bratton, respectively.
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel—
Upon Appointment as CinC Begins
Readying Fleet for War
Kimmel was the lead-off witness after the new legal staff took
over. He began by reading a prepared statement to the committee.
He said he realized the fl eet was vulnerable at Pearl Harbor,
but he had accepted the decision as “an historical fact.” 6
Th e fl eet was not then ready for war. So, Kimmel said, he set
out through “an intensive training program to make it ready.” 7
As noted, there were shortages in Hawaii of planes, especially
for reconnaissance and long-range attack, shortages also of plane
crews and of antiaircraft guns. 8 Kimmel visited Washington in
June 1941 and discussed the matter with Stark. He also had some
conversations on the subject with the president, who was “fully
cognizant” of the problem. 9 By that time the fl eet had been substantially
weakened by the shift to the Atlantic of a large contingent
of ships, about one quarter of the fl eet. Kimmel told the
committee he “felt that a strong Pacifi c Fleet was a real deterrent
to Japan,” but that “a weaker [fl eet] might be an invitation”
to attack. 10 According to his statement, Kimmel had argued
6 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 6, p. 2498.
7 Ibid., p. 2499.
8 Ibid., pp. 2720, 2722.
9 Ibid., p. 2719.
10Ibid., p. 2565. See also part 16, pp. 2248–49, Kimmel letter to Stark,
September 12, 1941.