Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 675
“On what authority?” Harper asked. “I’m the commanding
offi cer of this station. Yet, I had no knowledge of that meeting.
Why didn’t you inform me?”
“Why, I didn’t know you needed to know, Captain.”
Harper continued: “It is my understanding that he has asked
you to testify.”
“Yes, that’s right.”
“Well, for your information,” Harper said, “you are not to testify.
I can’t give you the reasons at this time, but some day you’ll
understand why. . . . I know you must be interested in helping
Captain Saff ord but at this point in time too much damage
has already been done. Much too much has been revealed. I
want you to understand that you are not to testify and that’s it!
I don’t want you to meet with Captain Saff ord anymore. Do
you understand?”
Briggs was shocked, shaken up. But he obeyed Harper’s orders;
he felt he had to. He assumed Saff ord must have contacted somebody
on the committee, suggested Briggs as a potential witness,
and told where he could be located. When Briggs got back to his
offi ce, he phoned Saff ord. At fi rst, Saff ord greeted his announcement
with stunned silence. Th en he said, “Well, I’m sorry to hear
that.” 5
However, Briggs had supplied Saff ord with the confi rmation
he had been seeking for so long; the Japanese had actually implemented
before the attack the false weather report “East Wind
Rain,” indicating trouble of some sort, possibly war, with the
United States as well as with England. But Saff ord realized that
he wouldn’t be able to use Briggs’s name.
5 Quotations as reported by Briggs in Bettina Bien Greaves’s 1988 interview.