Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

674 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Security’s group command headquarters. Saff ord phoned Briggs
and asked him to come to his offi ce.
Even though the war was over and the JCC was revealing a
great deal about MAGIC, Briggs was still security conscious. He
knew that the press was trying to discredit Saff ord as the one person
who continued to insist that the “Winds Code Execute” had
been received before the Japanese attack and that it had indicated
war with the United States and Great Britain. None of the persons
who, Saff ord claimed, had seen the message on December 4
or 5 had come forward to support his position.
Because of security considerations, Briggs was reluctant to
talk. However, when Saff ord showed him some of the information
he had found, Briggs “began to feel that this man knew what
he was talking about.” He realized Saff ord desperately needed
support. Briggs wanted to help. Th e two men met several times.
Briggs told Saff ord he had picked up the “Winds Code Execute”
in Morse code. 4 Saff ord asked Briggs if he would be willing to
testify before the JCC. “Yes,” he replied, “I’d be glad to.”
Some time after that meeting, Captain John S. Harper, the
commanding offi cer of the Naval Security station to which
Briggs was then assigned, summoned Briggs to his offi ce. Briggs
described Captain Harper later as “very much chain-of-command
oriented, strictly a line offi cer.” He wanted strict decorum, regulation
uniform at all times, none of this running round in public
with hats off as men did in the Army and Air Force. He was “a
gung-ho offi cer in all respects.”
Harper confronted Briggs.
“I understand that you have been seeing Captain Saff ord.”
“Th at’s right.”
4 Captain L.F. Saff ord, Cryptolog, 4:2, December 7, 1982.