Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 2 673
ever had to open those sealed envelopes, and enter the safe. I
might add, whenever an offi cer was relieved, we changed the
combination on his safe and substituted the new cards, and that
was the only time we ever had to get into those envelopes. 2
Saff ord had appeared as a witness before the Hart inquiry,
the Navy Court of Inquiry, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and
the Hewitt inquiry. He expected to be called again to testify if
Congress should decide to investigate further after the war ended.
Th erefore, as arrangements were being made to set up the congressional
committee in the fall of 1945, he continued his search
for the missing “Winds Execute,” which he was convinced had
been received.
Because of the erratic performance of radio waves and atmospheric
disturbances, Saff ord knew that the best chance of intercepting
the Tokyo broadcasts at the scheduled times in November-
December 1941 would have been on the east coast of the United
States. His recollection was that the “Winds Execute” had been
picked up on December 4, at Station “M” of the communication
intelligence group (ComInt) in Cheltenham, Maryland, and
then transmitted by telewriter to Saff ord’s offi ce, OP-20-G, in
Washington, D.C. 3
As Saff ord went through the fi les, he ran across the initials
“RT” on some of the Cheltenham intercepts. Every code clerk
had his own personal “sign,” initials by which the messages he
intercepted could be identifi ed. Saff ord discovered that “RT” was
the “sign” of Chief Warrant Offi cer Ralph T. Briggs, who had
been stationed in Cheltenham on December 4, 1941, and who,
in 1945, was back in Washington at one of the offi ces of Naval
2 Ibid.
3 Th is account of Saff ord’s contact with Briggs is based primarily on Bettina
Greaves’s interview of Briggs in Las Vegas, Nevada, August 14, 1988, typescript
in the author’s fi les.