Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 669
home, no eff ective hits being made in the harbor by this last
assault. 186
3. Th e Army’s lack of “the best means of defense against air
attack . . . fi ghter planes . . . [was] due to the diversion of this
type [of aircraft] before the outbreak of the war, to the British,
the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.” 187
Stark said he hadn’t seen the Knox report before, but expressed
no particular surprise at its revelations. 188 He said “there is very little
in that report that he [Knox] didn’t tell a considerable number
of us in his offi ce.” 189 It may be, as Stark said, that the Knox report
was no revelation to him. But he made no mention of two of the
three aspects that most impressed the committee members: the
fact that Kimmel and Short had received little intelligence from
Washington, and that one major reason for the shortage of reconnaissance
planes in Hawaii was the specifi ed diversion of fi ghter
planes to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.
* * * * *
Stark was the last witness to testify before Mitchell and his
legal staff left the committee. A week’s recess was called so the
new staff —Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P.
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane—could become familiar with the
186 Ibid., p. 2340. Testimony concerning the timing of the three waves of Japanese
attack vary according to the diff erent vantages of the several witnesses.
For instance, see ibid., part 1, pp. 43, 47, and 48, account of Admiral T.B.
Inglis; part 24, p. 1569, account of Kimmel; and part 22, pp. 87–88, account of
Short at the Roberts Commission.
187 Ibid., part 5, p. 2342.
188 Ibid., p. 2337.
189 Ibid., p. 2352.