Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

668 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Stark: I don’t know that I would. I think that might be a fair
deduction. 183
First Post-Attack Investigation
(December 1941)
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox had fl own to Pearl Harbor
almost immediately after the Japanese attack in order to investigate
the extent of the damage. He had written a report. No copies
of that report had been released and it had received practically
no publicity at the time. However, during the JCC hearings I, as
chief of the committee’s minority staff , located a copy. On January
4, 1946, toward the end of Stark’s testimony, Ferguson asked him
to read Knox’s report into the record. 184 Knox had made three
signifi cant points:
1. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had
any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move,
made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese
instructions to Nomura . . . by the insistence upon the precise
time of Nomura’s reply to Hull, at one o’clock on Sunday. 185
2. Th ree waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during
the assault. Because of the element of surprise, the fi rst
wave, which lasted from 7:55 to 8:30 a.m., was “substantially
unopposed” and wreaked considerable havoc. Yet, Navy antiaircraft
guns began fi ring in only about four minutes after the
attack started. Th e second wave over the harbor [9:–9:30 a.m.]
was resisted with far greater fi re power and a number of enemy
planes were shot down. Th e third attack over the harbor [from
about 11:30 to 1:00 p.m.] was met by so intensive a barrage
from the ships that it was driven off without getting the attack
183 Ibid., pp. 2185–86.
184 Ibid., pp. 2338–45.
185 Ibid., p. 2338.