Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 667
He was “positive of that.” 182 He was questioned about the “One
p.m. Message” by JCC Counsel Mitchell.
Mitchell: Well, this was what we lawyers call a last clear
chance. Th ese people were not ready at Pearl Harbor; the Jap
Fleet was piling in; here was a chance to get a message to them
that might have saved them; it reached your hands, we will say,
at 10:40; the chance wasn’t taken. Does that sum up the situation
as you see it? . . .
Stark: I gather from your question you are now pointing that
dispatch directly at Pearl Harbor. It didn’t mention Pearl
Harbor. It gave no inference with regard to Pearl Harbor any
more than it did the Philippines or the Netherlands East
Indies. . . . In the light of hindsight, if we had read into that
message that it meant an attack at that hour, and had sent it
out, of course, it would have been helpful. I wish such an inference
could have been drawn.
Mitchell: Th e fi xing of an exact hour to deliver the diplomatic
message and rout out the Secretary of State on a Sunday at
1:00 p.m., wasn’t it obvious that there was some special signifi -
cance, having in mind the history of the Japs striking fi rst and
declaring war afterwards?
Stark: If so, Mr. Mitchell, I would like to say that so far as
I know the Secretary of War didn’t read that inference into
it, the Secretary of State didn’t read that inference into it, the
Secretary of the Navy didn’t read that inference into it. General
Marshall and his staff didn’t read that inference into it, and
nobody mentioned it to me.
Mitchell: Is it fair to say that if Marshall hadn’t spotted that
message and started to send word out to Pearl Harbor that you
probably wouldn’t have sent anything?
182 Ibid., p. 2185.