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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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46 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

he didn’t receive what he considered satisfactory answers to his<br />

questions. He testifi ed later that one <strong>of</strong> Stimson’s anti-Japanese<br />

appointees in the State Department, Stanley Hornbeck, appeared<br />

to be “exercising a greater infl uence over the disposition <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Fleet than I was.” 37<br />

Richardson was called back to Washington a second time in<br />

October, at the request <strong>of</strong> the new Secretary <strong>of</strong> the Navy, Knox.<br />

When they met, the talk turned to the possibility <strong>of</strong> war in the<br />

Pacifi c. Th e British were planning to reopen the Burma Road<br />

shortly so as to be able to supply the Chinese forces from the<br />

south. Roosevelt was concerned about Japan’s possible reaction.<br />

“In the event the Japanese took drastic action, he, the president,<br />

was considering shutting <strong>of</strong>f all trade between Japan <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Americas, <strong>and</strong> to this end was considering establishing a patrol<br />

<strong>of</strong> light ships in two lines” west <strong>of</strong> Hawaii across the Pacifi c.<br />

Richardson asked Knox “whether the president was considering<br />

a declaration <strong>of</strong> war. Th e Secretary stated that the president<br />

hadn’t said, <strong>and</strong> that all he, Knox, knew was what he was told.”<br />

Richardson was “amazed” at this proposal; he said “the fl eet was<br />

not prepared to put such a plan into eff ect, nor for the war which<br />

would certainly result from such a course <strong>of</strong> action.” 38<br />

Richardson also visited the president. With FDR he went over<br />

the personnel situation, pointing out the need for more enlisted<br />

men. Roosevelt believed that “men in mechanical trades in civil<br />

life could be quickly inducted <strong>and</strong> made adequate sailor men, if<br />

their services were suddenly required.” Richardson explained to<br />

FDR that “a seasick garage mechanic would be <strong>of</strong> little use at sea,<br />

<strong>and</strong> that it took time for most young men to get their sea legs.” 39<br />

37 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation<br />

<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack. <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.:<br />

U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 1, p. 297.<br />

38 Richardson, On the Treadmill, pp. 399–400.<br />

39 Ibid., p. 434.

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