Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

666 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
message, Wilkinson said, he left, only to return at 10:30 or 10:40
with the “One p.m. Message.” 178
Stark did not remember the delivery of the “One p.m. Message”
and had “no recollection” as to when he received it.
My remembrance, as I said, was 10:40. When you say “at least
10:30,” I think you will fi nd testimony to that eff ect by a witness,
and if he states that, and I think he probably has good supporting
data, I accept it, that it was delivered to my offi ce and
then after that was given, by whomever he gave it, to me. 179
Captain Arthur H. McCollum also said Stark must have
arrived in his offi ce considerably earlier than usual that Sunday
morning. McCollum said he and Wilkinson had gone together to
Stark’s offi ce when they learned that he “had arrived in the Navy
Department,” probably about 9 or 9:15. Stark was alone when
McCollum and Wilkinson entered but, according to McCollum,
various other offi cers soon arrived—Ingersoll, Brainard, Noyes,
Turner, and possibly Schuirmann. McCollum said, “Th ere was
considerable going in and out at that time.” 180 JCC Chief Assistant
Counsel Gesell commented that one witness had said “there were
15 offi cers in there.” 181 Stark’s offi ce was apparently a busy place
that Sunday morning.
Stark’s acknowledged recollection of that Sunday morning
began only with his talk at 11:30 a.m. with Marshall about
the “One p.m. Message” and the decision to send a last-minute
message to the fi eld commanders. However, Stark was “certain
nobody mentioned Honolulu with reference to a daylight attack.”
178Ibid., part 4, pp. 1766–68.
179Ibid., part 5, pp. 2184–85.
180Ibid., part 36, p. 26.
181Ibid., part 5, p. 2185.