Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 665
morning of December 7 about the “Pilot Message,” which had
been received in Washington the afternoon of December 6. And
Stark said he had not learned until the morning of December
7 of the fi rst 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese reply, which had
been intercepted and decoded the previous afternoon and evening.
174 He did not remember when he had received the complete
14-part reply. He maintained only that he fi rst saw it “after I got
in the offi ce” on the morning of December 7, just what time he
could not recall. 175
Stark said he believed he was at home the evening of the 6th;
if he was out, a servant, if not a duty offi cer, was on hand to take
messages. He did not think anyone had called him. 176 He also
maintained that he had gone as usual to his offi ce that Sunday
morning:
I usually got down to the offi ce Sunday mornings about 10:30
and I just assumed that I had gotten there somewhere around
10:30 or 11:00. I was lazy on Sunday mornings unless there
was some special reason for getting up early. I usually took a
walk about the grounds and greenhouses at the Chief of Naval
Operations’ quarters and didn’t hurry about getting down and
my usual time, as I recall, was about 10:30 or 11. What time
it was on this particular Sunday morning I couldn’t go beyond
that. 177
Th is testimony contradicted other witnesses, and Stark knew
it. Wilkinson was one who testifi ed that Stark was in his offi ce
considerably earlier than 10:30—about 9:15, he said—when he
arrived with part 14 of the Japanese reply. After delivering that
174Ibid., pp. 2183, 2187.
175Ibid., p. 2187.
176Ibid., pp. 2187, 2291, 2335.
177Ibid., pp. 2183, 2335.