Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

664 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
to make a reconnaissance and I had directed Kimmel to make a
defensive deployment.” Stark felt “Th e two [warnings] hooked
up together.” 168
While questioning Stark, Representative Keefe said he had
heard him say “repeatedly” that he
did not expect an attack at Pearl Harbor; you were surprised,
the president was surprised, General Marshall was surprised,
you were all surprised . . . and yet you expected Kimmel with
less information than you had of the situation, even conceding
this order which was given on the war warning . . . to be
prepared against an attack which none of you thought would
take place.
Keefe found it “diffi cult . . . to reconcile those two positions.” 169
Stark admitted he had not expected an attack on Pearl Harbor,
although “we all recognized it to be a possibility.” 170 He “had sent
to Kimmel for action a war warning signal containing a directive
and containing what information we had.” It had directed
Kimmel to make “a defensive deployment.” Stark had thought
that with such a warning the fl eet would be put “on a war footing
out there so far as any surprise was concerned.” 171
Stark’s responsibility included keeping the fl eet commanders
informed and assuring the safety of the Navy. Yet under questioning
Stark admitted to having no recollection of having seen the
Japanese Pearl Harbor bomb plot or “ships-in-harbor” messages. 172
And he denied having heard that a “Winds Execute” was received
before the attack. 173 Moreover, he said he had not known until the
168Ibid., part 5, p. 2447.
169Ibid., pp. 2447–48.
170Ibid., p. 2448.
171Ibid., p. 2445.
172Ibid., pp. 2173–74, 2396–400.
173Ibid., p. 2182.