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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Joint Congressional Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack: Part 1 663<br />

Quoting Kimmel’s June 30, 1941, report, Stark said he realized<br />

the defense forces at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> were “[i]nadequate . . . to<br />

provide for the safety <strong>of</strong> the Fleet in harbor.” 161 Th ey had been<br />

further weakened in mid-1941, as had been contemplated in the<br />

Navy Basic War Plan, WPL-46, when some <strong>of</strong> the fl eet’s ships<br />

were transferred to the Atlantic to be used in taking the Azores.<br />

Although that plan was never carried out, the ships remained in<br />

the Atlantic <strong>and</strong> were not returned to Hawaii. 162 Th en just before<br />

the attack, the strength <strong>of</strong> the fl eet was again reduced when 50<br />

pursuit planes were transferred, 25 each, to Wake <strong>and</strong> Midway. 163<br />

On November 27, the day after Hull presented the United States’s<br />

note to the Japanese ambassadors, the Navy had sent the three fl eet<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ers—Hart, Kimmel, <strong>and</strong> King—a “war warning.” Japan<br />

was “expected within the next few days” to launch “an amphibious<br />

expedition against either the Philippines, Th ai or Kra peninsula or<br />

possibly Borneo.” 164 Stark testifi ed that he “had worked for hours”<br />

on this message, “particularly the war warning, which was all out.”<br />

He “thought it would convey what I intended it should convey.<br />

I thought it was very plain <strong>and</strong> it fl ew all the danger signals.” 165<br />

Stark had cleared the message personally with the secretary <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Navy <strong>and</strong> he had “either told the president beforeh<strong>and</strong> or immediately<br />

after.” Stark did “know that within 24 hours, if not before<br />

. . . it had his full approval <strong>and</strong> that he gave us an O.K.” 166<br />

Also on November 27 the Army sent warnings to<br />

MacArthur in the Philippines <strong>and</strong> Short. 167 According to Stark,<br />

“[T]he outst<strong>and</strong>ing things in the Army message . . . was that<br />

war might come at any moment.” Th e message “directed Short<br />

161 Ibid., part 5, p. 2107.<br />

162 Ibid. See also part 6, p. 2505, Kimmel statement to the Joint Committee.<br />

163 Ibid., part 5, pp. 2154–71.<br />

164 Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, CNO Dispatch #272337.<br />

165 Ibid., part 5, p. 2447.<br />

166 Ibid., p. 2151.<br />

167 Ibid., part 14, pp. 1328–29.

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