Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Joint Congressional Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack: Part 1 661
Atlantic theater. 149 He had found Congress cooperative: “[O]ver
the fi scal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, those fi gures show that
the Congress exceeded the Presidential Budget estimate . . . in
the matter of appropriations.” 150 Stark also told of his struggle
with the president in seeking approval for expanding the naval
force. He had pleaded with FDR on behalf of the Pacifi c Fleet;
it “should at least at fi rst remain strong until we see what Japan is
going to do.” 151
Stark testifi ed that as CNO he had developed war plans—
Rainbow No. 3 “for governing naval operations in case of war with
Japan, Germany, and Italy,” 152 and then Rainbow No. 5, which
he had helped to develop with the Army. Rainbow No. 5 was a
joint basic war plan based on understandings with the British and
Canadians in ABC-1—January 29–March 27, 1941. 153
Stark said his duties included “keep[ing] the fl eet commanders
in Atlantic, Pacifi c, and Asiatic waters informed of signifi -
cant developments in political and military matters of concern to
them.” 154 On April 3, 1941, Stark wrote Kimmel about the joint
U.S.-British war plan that had been drawn up and on which Basic
War Plan Rainbow No. 5 had been based. Both he and Marshall
had approved this war plan. Stark had discussed it at length with
Roosevelt, had read to him his April 3 letter to Kimmel setting
forth the plan’s provisions, and had “received his [FDR’s] general
assent,” and “at an appropriate time, [the plan] is expected to
receive the [offi cial] approval of the president.” 155 According to
Rainbow No. 5, WPL-46, the U.S. Pacifi c Fleet was to
149 Ibid., pp. 2100–01.
150 Ibid., p. 2459.
151 Ibid., p. 2112.
152 Ibid., p. 2102.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid., pp. 2109, 2175–77.
155 Ibid., part 33, pp. 1357–58.